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SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /089 W

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2702

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0163

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MARCH 31 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 165TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH WAS HELD ON MARCH 31 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
SOVIET REP (TARASOV), CZECHOSLOVAK REP KEBLUSEK DELIVERED
THE ONLY STATEMENT. HIS PRESENTATION REVIEWED AT LENGTH
EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE
CEILINGS. IT ALSO INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. CZECHOSLOVAK
REP GAVE CREDIT TO CONSTRUCTIVE EASTERN ACTIONS FOR
OPENING UP THESE OPPORTUNITIES AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE
THAT THEY WOULD ASSIST WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN CORRECTING
THEIR ERRONEOUS ESTIMATES OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH
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OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1) IF IT IS TO BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, THE CONTENTS OF
A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT MUST ACCORD WITH THE CONTEMPORARY
MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION.

2) CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS FROM THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FAVORED REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BY CLEARLY DEFINED AMOUNTS.

3) WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS HAVE LATELY STRESSED THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST EMBODY THE WESTERN CONCEPTS OF PARITY AND COLLECTIVITY NOT ONLY AS A REQUIREMENT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL WESTERN PARTICIPANT, BUT OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

4) THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION AGREES WITH RECENT CRITICISMS MADE BY OTHER EASTERN SPEAKERS OF THESE WESTERN CONCEPTS.

5) THE NOTION OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS CONTRADICTS THE VERY IDEA OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

6) IN INSISTING ON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE ARTIFICIALLY SHIFTING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A "BLOC" BASIS.

7) COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WOULD ENABLE SOME PARTICIPANTS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES EVEN TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES OVER PRESENT LEVELS.

8) SUCH A SITUATION IS INADMISSABLE AND AT VARIANCE WITH THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHOSE TITLE UNAMBIGUOUSLY PRESUPPOSES CONFIDENTIAL

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FORCE REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

9 THE FLUCTUATIONS IN NATIONAL FORCE LEVELS WHICH COULD OCCUR UNDER COLLECTIVE CEILINGS COULD GREATLY INFLUENCE THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE REDUCTION AREA TO THE DETRIMENT OF STRENGTHENED PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

10) IT IS ONLY NATURAL TO DEMAND THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

11) IT IS UNACCEPTABLE THAT SOME PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE CLEARLY DEFINED OBLIGATIONS, WHILE OTHERS WOULD NOT.

12) THE IMPOSITION OF PRECISE OBLIGATIONS ON EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS FOR MAINTAINING LOWER FORCE LEVELS FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS.

13) ASIDE FROM US FORCES, THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHICH WESTERN FORCES WERE BEING REDUCED AND WHETHER WESTERN REDUCTIONS REALLY AFFECTED NATO'S MILITARY POTENTIAL OR WERE CONFINED TO ELEMENTS

OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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14) THE LOGIC OF THE WESTERN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT UP TO THE NATO BLOC AS A WHOLE.

15) WHILE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS DO NOT SEEK TO INTERFERE WITH
THE INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF NATO, THEY LEGITIMATELY REQUIRE
ASSURANCE THAT EACH WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WILL TAKE
PART IN REDUCTIONS IN AN AGREED TIME PERIOD AND VOLUME.

16) SINCE, AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE ROLES OF SOVIET AND US FORCES
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT,
THE BURDEN OF A NATIONAL CEILING ON SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA
WOULD BE MUCH GREATER THAN THE ONE RESULTING FROM A SIMILAR
CEILING ON US FORCES.

17) MEANWHILE, NATO STATES HAVING THE MOST SIZEABLE FORCES IN
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THE AREA COULD ACTUALLY INCREASE THOSE FORCES.

18) THE WESTERN APPROACH WOULD ACTUALLY IMPOSE TWO CEILINGS ON SOVIET FORCES -- ONE ON MANPOWER AND THE OTHER ON ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS.

19 THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR SOME PARTICIPANTS AND COLLECTIVE ONES FOR OTHERS IS PART OF THE WEST'S ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY ASSYMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

20) UNFORTUNATELY, WESTERN REPS CONTINUE TO IGNORE EASTERN ARGUMENTATION THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD CHANGE THE EXISTING FORCE BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

21) ALTHOUGH THE DISCUSSION OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE CONTINUES TO OCCUPY AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT DISCUSSION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION FROM THE MAIN TASK OF DRAFTING A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

22) AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA IS REQUIRED SOLELY TO ESTABLISH THE STRENGTH OF THESE FORCES SO AS TO DEFINE THE QUANTITY OF REDUCTIONS AND OF THE FORCES REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS.

23) THANKS TO THE EAST'S OCT 25 PROPOSAL AND SUBSEQUENT CONSTRUCTIVE EASTERN STEPS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES HAVE BEEN CREATED TO ASSIST WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN CORRECTING THEIR MISTAKEN ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT FORCES.

24) HOWEVER, MERE RECOGNITION BY THE WEST OF ITS COUNTING ERRORS WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

25) RATHER, THE WEST MUST ALSO BRING ITS OVERALL POSITION
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INTO LINE WITH THE AGREED PURPOSES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOULD RESPOND ADEQUATELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO EASTERN COMPROMISE PROPOSALS SO THAT PROGRESS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT CAN AT LAST BE MADE. RESOR

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